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Man-days charged per man Pearl Harbor Navy Ship Yard.  
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Mapping Dark Maritime Networks
Findings
• We confirm that MC-DL-RASM produces reasonable results in the Peacetime, Rising Tensions, and  scenarios we
examined, and that the “mini-CLF” concept of operations is a viable alternative to the traditional CLF concept.
• We also observe that in each scenario, the shuttles will RAS with the CLF ships if possible rather than using a port
to resupply. This could be an indication that having a port available in the AO is not as important to maintaining
the warships on station as having a constant supply of CLF ships.
• MCS has been presented as a way to build predictive risk models that can tie logistics processes and expenditures
to mission outcomes.  Some of these metrics have been demonstrated on the 688 Class Submarine DSRA process
on a small dataset, and recommendations were made on which sub-processes might be explored, and what
additional data might be required to reduce schedule and budget risk, and improve its prediction.
• Logistics risk must be tied to readiness and mission risk, to facilitate an appropriate allocation of funds among
activities that compete to provide mission capacity.
• What becomes clear from this analysis is that there is a high degree of predictability associated with the CTF-73
logistics network as a result of overdependence on the primary ports of transshipment.  This creates vulnerabilities
to disruption during times of crisis or conflict.
• In terms of social media vulnerability, nodes with high hub and authority scores are most vulnerable to exploitation
as sources of information regarding the CTF-73 logistics network.
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Methodology
• Through quantitative research, a discrete-time optimization model was used in
a variety of finite-duration operational scenarios to perform sensitivity analysis
on various parameters of ship design, including amount of storage space for
palletized cargo and the breakdown of the liquid capacity need for each type of
fuel (JP5 and DFM).
• Quantitative and qualitative system-level modelling used integrated logistics
risk metrics to investigate critical logistics decisions of concern to
COMLOGWESTPAC and to explore with the sponsor how such metrics might
be made actionable.
• Quantitative and qualitative data was used to identify nodes (ships/loitering
areas) in the maritime logistics network, enabling key metrics to be measured
and analyzed. Sociograms were produced to depict the virtual maritime
logistics network and a separate quantitative assessment of social media
vulnerabilities was provided.
• Models and tools were developed for each aspect of study.
Shuttle DFM consumable inventory (Scenario 3).
NRP Project ID:
NPS-18-N077-A
This research sought to answer the following questions:
• What are the logistics risk metrics that can be applied to increase
reliability of logistics performance and facilitate surety in readiness?
• Can those metrics be applied to submarine dry dock operations in a
useful way?
• Does the “mini-CLF” idea remain feasible in a multi-commodity
setting?
• What breakdown of liquid fuel storage capacity and palletized cargo
capacity is most effective?
• How do the characteristics of a hypothetical “mini-CLF” ship impact
the performance of a decentralized resupply system?
• Are any existing naval platforms particularly promising as “mini-
CLF” ships?
• Can maritime network analysis and social media exploitation reveal
vulnerabilities in the CTF-73 logistics network?
• Future research could consider heuristic approaches to planning, as an
alternative to integer programming.  We have given examples of how
logistics risk can be tied to readiness risk and mission risk through
simulation.  Given the budget constraints we face, we recommend that
further research explore simulation models, to assist in the proper
allocation of scarce budgets to those logistics processes that contribute
most to the reduction is readiness risk and mission risk.
• By distributing transshipment ports more widely among partner or friendly
nations, there would be a greater likelihood of survivability/sustainability of
the logistics network as a whole. It would be useful for official Navy sites to
monitor the type of information that is being publicly shared and those sites
that routinely follow these accounts.  Further, local media reporting of CTF-
73 activities should also be routinely monitored and assessed.
• Tools and models have been provided for CTF-73 analysts to expand upon
this research.
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